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Abstract: The aim of this article is to critically examine what I call Action-Centric Theories 
of Representation (ACToRs). I include in this category theories of representation that (1) 
reject construing representation in terms of a relation that holds between representation itself 
(the representational vehicle) and what is represented, and instead (2) try to bring the function 
that representations play for cognitive systems to the center stage. Roughly speaking, 
according to proponents of ACToRs, what makes a representation (that is, what is constitutive 
of it being a representation) is its being functionally involved in preselecting or guiding the 
actions of cognitive systems. I intend to argue that while definitely valuable, ACToRs are 
underconstrained and thus not entirely satisfying, since there exist structures that would count 
as representations according to ACToRs, but which do not play functional roles that could be 
nontrivially or in an explanatorily valuable way classified as representing something for a 
cognitive system. I outline a remedy for this theoretical situation by postulating that a fully 
satisfying theory of representation in cognitive science should have two factors; i.e., it should 
combine the pragmatic, action-oriented aspect present in ACToRs with an element that 
emphasizes the importance of the relation holding between a representational vehicle and 
what is represented. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 The turn of the 20th century in cognitive science will probably be remembered as a 
time when “embodied”, “enactive”, and “extended” approaches came to play a prominent role 
in theorizing about, modelling, and studying cognition. Admittedly, there is (still) no 
universal consensus as to how exactly we should understand these approaches and the way 
they are interrelated (but see e.g. Goldman, 2012; Shapiro, 2010). However, it seems safe to 
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say that they have two very broad characteristics in common. First, proponents of these 
approaches usually see themselves as being in opposition to “classical” cognitive science, 
which construes cognition in terms of rule-based symbolic computation. Second, they criticize 
the classical view of cognition as too spectatorial or passive, and opt instead for a view that 
emphasizes that cognition has evolved in order to help embodied agents to control their 
ongoing interactions with the environments they inhabit. 
 Among the “orthodox” assumptions of classical cognitive science that are often 
criticized and discarded by proponents of these new approaches is the idea that cognition 
involves internal representations. Thus, embodied, enactive, or extended cognitive science 
seems to be a natural ally of anti-representationalism. Under closer examination, however, it 
turns out that this diagnosis is an oversimplification. There have been attempts to reconcile 
representationalism with new approaches in cognitive science (see e.g. Clark & Grush 1999). 
In this article, I will critically examine a specific strategy for achieving this sort of 
reconciliationone that tries to reconceptualize the very nature of representations by 
postulating that being a representation is constitutively dependent on being somehow involved 
in guiding the actions of a cognitive system (Anderson & Rosenberg 2004, 2008; Bickhard 
1993, 1999, 2004a, 2004b; for an attempt to combine this approach with computationalism in 
cognitive science, see also Miłkowski, 2013). Throughout this paper, I will call proposals of 
this sort “Action-Centric Theories of Representation” (ACToRs).  
 Although I think that ACToRs are, in some important respects, a step in the right 
direction, I also think that they are fundamentally incomplete. ACToRs are too liberal and 
underconstrained and thus do not give us a notion of representation that is explanatorily 
nontrivial and valuable. This is because at least some cognitive structures that would have to 
count as representations according to ACToRs do not meet what William Ramsey (2007) calls 
the “job description challenge”: under closer scrutiny, it turns out that those structures do not 
play functional roles that are recognizably representational, and because of that, they cannot 
be characterized as representations in an explanatorily illuminating way. Showing that this is 
the case is my first aim in this article. My second aim is to suggest a way of expanding the 
notion of representation present in ACToRs so that it can meet Ramsey’s challenge. 
According to my proposal, what we need is a two-factor theory of representation, one that 
combines the action-oriented or pragmatic element present in ACToRs with the idea that 
representations also owe their representational status to a relation (“correspondence”) that 
holds between the representation itself (the vehicle) and what is represented. 
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 I will proceed as follows. In section 2, I will first describe what I take to be the basic 
tenets of ACToRs and then take a closer look at two specific theories that are representative 
examples of the action-centric approach, namely Mark Bickhard’s interactivist theory of 
representation and Michael L. Anderson and Gregg Rosenberg’s action guidance theory of 
representation. In section 3, I will present Ramsey’s idea of the job description challenge. In 
section 4, I will try to show that the notion of representation contained in ACToRs is too 
liberal and underconstrained to meet the job description challenge. In section 5, I will suggest 
that this problem can be dealt with by extending ACToRs to create a two-factor theory of 
representation. I will also present a very sketchy outline of how this sort of two-factor theory 
might (and should) look. 
 
2. Action-Centric Theories of Representations 
 
2.1. ACToRs: core ideas 
 
 It might be useful to introduce ACToRs by pointing to what they are opposed to. 
Proponents of the action-centric approach often claim that their proposals are based on the 
rejection of a certain way of thinking about the nature of representation, one that is deeply 
embedded in today’s mainstream philosophy and cognitive science. As Mark Bickhard 
(2004b) puts it, this way of thinking construes representations as encodings or 
correspondences, and it can be expressed using the metaphor of “impressions” left by a signet 
ring (the world or what is represented) in a piece of wax (the representation). 
Correspondence-based theories see representations as codes whose constituents are mapped 
on to constituents of the represented domain. Correspondences are supposed to be established 
by some sort of (natural) relation that holds between the representation and what is 
represented. But what sort of relation is this? This is a broad subject, but suffice it to say that 
causal-nomological dependence, asymmetric causal dependence, or isomorphism are some of 
the candidates that have been proposed in the contemporary literature. Michael L. Anderson 
and Gregg Rosenberg express a similar diagnosis to Bickhard when they claim that the 
problem with many contemporary theories of representation lies in the fact that they are input-
focused, meaning that “they give too much importance to the ways in which the environment 
affects the organism to endow its states with representational meaning” (2008, p. 56). To put 
it very broadly then, ACToRs are opposed to a very general idea about the fundamental nature 
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of representation, namely the idea that what is constitutive of being a representation is a 
correspondence between the representation itself and what is represented. 
 Characteristic of proponents of ACToRs is that, instead of proposing yet another 
correspondence-establishing relation, they attempt to make something of a paradigm shift in 
our thinking about what representations really are. If most “classical” theories are indeed 
input-focused, then ACToRs can be described as trying bring the representation’s 
outputi.e., the relationship between representation and its userto the center stage. From 
this point of view, of crucial importance for our thinking about the nature representations is 
the fact that representations are for their users, with all their practical purposes. To put it more 
precisely, we could say that proponents of ACToRs approach the subject matter in the 
following way. First, they ask what it is that representations do for their users, or what is the 
“business” of using representations. Second, they treat an answer to this question as a basis 
for their positive theory of representation, in accordance with Anderson and Rosenberg’s 
claim that “representations are what representation do” (2008, p. 56, emphasis added). 
 So what function do representations serve for their users? According to ACToRs, their 
role consists in controlling or guiding the user’s actions. Thanks to representations, cognitive 
systems have the ability to practically orient themselves in the world, perform actions that are 
adaptive given the circumstances, or (pre)select one action among many that are potentially 
available at a given moment. 
 One very important clarification about what I take ACToRs to be committed to is in 
order. ACToRs can be interpreted in two very different ways. According to a weak 
interpretation, ACToRs simply give an account of the function that representations play for 
representation-using systems. According to a strong interpretation, (1) ACToRs are theories 
of what constitutes representationswhat makes them representationsand (2) they put 
forward the thesis that representations are constituted by their function in providing guidance 
for action. The weak and strong interpretations are clearly very different. Imagine an 
analogical situation, in which someone claims that the function of cars is to enable people to 
cover long distances. On one hand, this is a trivial truth about what cars are for. On the other 
hand, if you interpret this claim stronglyi.e., as saying that what constitutes a car is playing 
a role in enabling people to cover long distancesthen you end up with a thesis that is 
obviously false, since there exist other artifacts that carry out the same function. Now, my aim 
here is not to challenge an idea that I take to be fairly unproblematic, namely that 
representations serve to guide or preselect actions. I will not argue against a weak 
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interpretation of ACToRs. I also do not think that the weak interpretation is what proponents 
of ACToRs argue for. What they mean to defend, I think, is the strong interpretation of their 
thesis. And it is this version of action-centrism with which I take issue. What I want to bring 
into question here, then, is the idea that what makes something a representation is the fact that 
it is involved in controlling the actions of cognitive systems.  
 The discussion so far has given a very cursory introduction to ACToRs by pointing out 
the basic ideas that they have in common. Now I want to take a closer look at two theories 
that I take to be emblematic of the action-centric approach: Bickhard’s interactivist theory and 
Anderson and Rosenberg’s action guidance theory. I will present both theories in subsections 
2.2 and 2.3, respectively. However, it needs to be stressed at the outset that both theories are 
conceptually complex in a way to which I cannot fully give justice here. For example, 
Bickhard presents his proposal against a broader conceptual and theoretical background of 
process ontology and an “interactivist” view of cognition as such (see Bickhard, 2009). In 
addition, both Bickhard (1993, 1999, 2004a, 2004b), as well as Anderson and Rosenberg 
(2004, 2008) put a lot of effort into developing their respective theories in a way that avoids 
presupposing representational notions when explaining representation. In my reconstruction, I 
will pass over many of these details and instead concentrate on what I take to be the essential 
theses of both theories. I will also charitably assume that both theories avoid vicious circles or 
metaphysical assumptions that are in any way problematic. 
 
2.2. Bickhard’s interactivist theory of representation 
 
 Bickhard builds his theory on the idea that representations owe their normativitythe 
fact that they are assessable for truth or accuracyto the normativity of (inter)actions (the 
following reconstruction is based on Bickhard, 1993, 1999, 2004a, 2004b). Actions have 
certain conditions of success, and the normativity of representations is derivative, 
explanatorily and metaphysically, from that practical normativity. But what does the 
normativity of actions consist in? Bickhard’s answer to this question points to the fact that all 
living systems need to maintain themselves by staying in a state that is far from 
thermodynamic equilibrium. Now, contrary to some self-maintaining systems like a candle 
flamewhich keeps itself in existence by vaporizing wax into flammable gases, but is able to 
do so only under one set of specific external conditionscognitive systems have the capacity 
for recursive self-maintenance. That is, the latter can maintain themselves over a range of 
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changes in environmental conditions. Cognitive systems can differentiate environmental 
circumstances and change their course of action accordingly, keeping themselves in a far-
from-thermodynamic equilibrium state despite changes in environment. For every action 
(type), there are (types of) conditions under which this action contributes to the organism’s 
maintenance. These are, for Bickhard, conditions of this action’s success.1   
 Bickhard observes that in cognitive systems of appropriate complexity, it will usually 
be the case that (1) there is more than one possible action to perform in given circumstances, 
and (2) the system thus faces the challenge of preselecting one of those actions in a way that 
maximizes its self-maintenance. In such a situation, organisms will not simply trigger a given 
action in given circumstances, but will rather develop an ability to set up what Bickhard calls 
indications of interactive potentialities. Without delving into the details of Bickhard’s 
definition of indication, we may roughly say that indication I of some potential action A in 
circumstances C is an internal state (or process, if we choose to stay closer to Bickhard’s 
metaphysical framework) which is produced as a result of the occurrence of C and which 
enables the system, or makes it possible for the system, to perform action A (for details, see 
Bickhard, 1993). Usually more than one action will be available in a given situation, so that 
more than one possibility for action will be indicated2. 
 According to Bickhard, indications of interactive potentialities are a fundamental or 
basic form of representation. It needs to be stressed, though, that what makes them 
representations is not how they are related to the external world, but rather the role they play 
with regards to (inter)actions. They owe their status as representations to how they enable the 
organism to act in an adaptive, anticipatory way. Every indicated action has conditions of 
success associated with it, that is, conditions that should occur if this action is to contribute to 
the system’s self-maintenance. As Bickhard puts it, indicated (inter)actions “dynamically 
presuppose” that conditions occur which are needed for those actions to be successful. It is 
those dynamic presuppositions that constitute or determine representational content. These 
                                                             
1 For example, a bacterium may have the ability to perform two actions: swimming and tumbling (Bickhard 
2004a). Swimming enables self-maintenance when the bacterium is moving up a sugar gradient, and so this is 
this action’s condition of success. Tumbling contributes to self-maintenance when the bacterium finds itself 
moving down a sugar gradient, and so this is this action’s condition of success. 
2 Sometimes Bickhard (e.g. 1999) also claims that, in addition to indications of interactions themselves, the 
interaction’s internal outcomes need to be indicated as well. If this claim is added to the theory, then what is 
needed to set up an indication of interactive potentiality is not only an indication of a possible action itself, but 
also an indication of internal states that the former is predicted to produce. 
7 
 
contents are not explicitly encoded for Bickhard, but rather are implicit in the dynamical 
presuppositions of indicated actions. 
 Two important additional remarks are in order. First, Bickhard claims that the 
abovementioned story only explains the most fundamental or rudimentary form of 
representation, namely interactive representation. As I understand the theory, these are 
representations with simple contents like “Circumstances affording action X, now”. However, 
Bickhard also claims (and attempts to show, see esp. Bickhard, 2004b; Bickhard & Terveen, 
1995) that other, more sophisticated forms of representationlike representations of stable 
physical objects or abstract entitiesare built upon the basis of interactive representation.  
 Second, Bickhard claims that his interactivist theory has one very important advantage 
over any correspondence-based theory. This is that only the former can explain not only how 
representational error is possible, but also how system-detectable representational error is 
possible (see especially Bickhard, 1999). For Bickhard, explaining how it is possible for a 
cognitive system to detect the fact that it is using a false or inaccurate representation is an 
important criterion of adequacy for any theory of representation. This is also where he thinks 
all theories based on an idea of representation as correspondence uniformly fail. Animals 
seem to have no way of telling whether a given correspondence-establishing relation (causal 
co-variation, asymmetric dependency, isomorphism, etc.) holds between the representation 
they are using and what they are representing. Furthermore, from the point of view of 
correspondence-based theories, error detection would need to generate a regress: to detect an 
error of representation R1, the system would need to form an independent representation R2 of 
whether the correspondence-establishing relation holds between R1 and the world; but now 
the problem reappears, since similar sort of story would be needed to explain the ability to 
detect an error in R2 (which would call for yet another representation R3); and so on. From an 
interactivist point of view, explaining error-detection seems to be achievable in a rather 
straightforward way. The representation is false if its dynamic presuppositions are false. A 
representation-user can detect this falsehood by detecting that an action based on this 
representation has failed. Representational error is detectable through action failure. So 
whenever an action that was based on a representation fails, detecting the occurrence of this 
fact is a way of telling that the representation was false, which may in turn be potentially 
useful for error-based learning. 
 
2.3. Anderson and Rosenberg’s action guidance theory of representation 
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 I will now turn to Anderson and Rosenberg’s (henceforth A&R) action guidance 
theory (the following reconstruction is based upon Anderson & Rosenberg, 2004, 2008). At 
the heart of A&R’s proposal is the idea that the function of representation is to guide the 
actions of representation-users. Representations are entities whose job it is to enable natural 
and artificial cognitive systems to perform intelligent, adaptive actions with respect to their 
environments. When presenting their case, A&R are mostly concerned with unpacking this 
very broad and intuitive idea in a technical and detailed manner. So, according to their 
technical proposal, “a mental token T (of some given type) represents an entity E for subject 
S, just in case tokens of that type are standardly used by S to guide its actions with respect to 
E” (Anderson & Rosenberg, 2008, p. 67). Let us take closer look at this characterization. 
 For A&R, a T token guides the actions of S by “making its features available to the 
subject’s motor systems and rational control processes for use in making discriminating 
choices between possible actions or possible ways of executing actions” (Anderson & 
Rosenberg, 2008, p. 68). Importantly, the category of representation-guided actions is 
supposed to include both motor actions and cognitive actions. By saying that T tokens are 
“standardly used” by S to guide its actions, A&R mean that S uses T tokens to guide its 
actions with respect to E in virtue of having an “enduring conscious preference or conditioned 
reflex” to use T tokens to guide its actions. A&R also put a lot of effort into characterizing 
technically what it means for an action to be performed “with respect to” some entity E. To 
cut a long and complex story short and make it (relatively) simple, three conditions need to be 
met for an action to be performed with respect to E (the following discussion covers motor 
actions only, although A&R treat cognitive actions in a very similar manner). First, the action 
should be susceptible to rational interpretation and have a “motivational reason” behind it. 
Second, the motivating reason behind this action should be an “assumption of information” 
about E, i.e. the action should be such that it unfolds as though it were based on assumption 
that T tokens carry information about E (the system in question behaves “as if” it assumed 
that T tokens encode information about E). Third, E should be the focus of the expected 
change that this action is to bring about; more precisely, E should be the entity that is 
continuously monitored by feedback channels as the action is performed. 
 Action guidance theory can be illustrated with the following simplistic example. 
Consider a very simple cognitive system S, whose whole life boils down to approaching some 
entities (say, food and reproductive partners) and avoiding others (say, predators). S contains 
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a very simple mechanism, composed of two components: (1) M, which sends “approach” or 
“avoid” motor commands to the effectors, and (2) D, which is in the business of affecting M 
in such a way that it actually sends one of those two commands to the effectors, depending on 
whether D itself is in a state D1 (which activates approaching) or D2 (which activates 
avoidance). In other words, D “decides” what should be done and M moves the system in one 
of two ways. The whole process is set up as though S acted on an assumption that D encodes 
information about external states of affairs. Suppose that on a given occasion S stumbles upon 
a token of the type O (say, a piece of food), D goes into state D1 and thus causes (through 
affecting M) S to move in the direction of O. Suppose further that D in the state D1 is 
standardly used to make S approach Os. If this is the case, then D in state D1 could be 
described as guiding S’s actions with respect to Os, and thus as representing Os for S. In other 
words, D1 would then represent simple content like “Food here, now”. 
 One last observation to make about action guidance theory is that A&R follow 
Bickhard when they claim that an important strength of their theory is its ability to explain 
system-detectable representational error. The way A&R handle this subject is basically the 
same as Bickhard. Representational error consists in the fact that an action that was guided by 
a given representation “failed in its intent, and it failed partly or wholly because of the 
guidance provided by that representation” (Anderson & Rosenberg, 2008, p. 78). This error in 
representation can be detected when an action guided by this representation fails. 
 
3. Ramsey’s job description challenge 
 
 As was stated at the outset, my aim in this article is to challenge ACToRs. It is 
important, though, to be explicit about how I intend to do this. I will approach my goal from a 
specific angle, one that is different from the way theories of representation are usually treated 
in the literaturenamely as attempts at naturalizing intentional content. Instead of asking 
whether ACToRs give us a good theory of how intentional content is determined, I want to 
concentrate on their explanatory value for cognitive science. More specifically, my intention 
is to ask whether representations postulated by ACToRs actually play their explanatory roles 
qua representations; or whether explanations of cognitive phenomena that posit internal 
structures meeting ACToRs’ criteria for being a representation actually earn their status as 
genuinely representational explanations. 
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 My discussion will draw on a strategy of evaluating the explanatory status of 
representational posits in cognitive science that was introduced by William Ramsey in his 
book Representation Reconsidered (2007). Ramsey’s proposal stems from a suspicion that the 
term “representation” is often used by cognitive scientists in an excessively liberal and 
unconstrained way, which deprives it of any true explanatory value. When explaining 
phenomena of interest, cognitive scientists show a tendency to call all sorts of internal 
structures “representations”, including structures for which it is far from clear why they 
should be classified that way at all. The problem is not that those structures do not play an 
important role in cognitive-scientific explanations, but rather that they do not play their 
explanatory roles as representations. 
 Ramsey (2007) postulates that we need a principled way of judging the real 
explanatory value of different notions of representation routinely used in cognitive science. 
His positive proposal is founded on the idea of the job description challenge (henceforth 
JDC). This idea is based on an assumption that representational explanations in cognitive 
science consist in describing cognitive mechanisms whose components are functionally 
involved in representing something. That is, something explains a given phenomenon as a 
representation because it functions as a representation in a mechanism responsible for that 
phenomenon (this assumption is in line with the mechanistic outlook on the nature of 
cognitive-scientific explanation, see e.g. Bechtel, 2008). Meeting the JDC requires showing 
how exactly a given internal structure or state posited as a representation actually serves or 
functions as a representation in a given cognitive mechanism.  
 The procedure of using JDC runs roughly as follows (see Ramsey, 2007). One starts 
by examining the conceptual and explanatory practice of cognitive scientists in order extract a 
specific notion or a way of understanding representation that is implicitly or explicitly present 
in this practice. In doing so, one must concentrate on the functional roles that are attributed to 
purported representations, that is, their “job description”. Second, one needs to take a closer 
look at this job description and ask whether states or structures that meet this job description 
can be classifiedin an intuitive, natural and understandable manneras playing the role of 
representation. Does it make sense to describe these structures as standing-in for something? 
Or does the intentional content we may attribute to them determine their functional role 
within the system or mechanism in which they are embedded? According to Ramsey, if 
answers to questions like these are positive for a given notion of representation, then this 
notion meets the JDC. Using this notion should give some real explanatory purchase or enable 
us to understand phenomena in way that is impossible without it. On the other hand, if the 
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answers are negative in a given case, then we are dealing with a notion of representation that 
fails to meet the JDC. This notion turns out to be superfluous and devoid of real explanatory 
value. We could just as well do without it in our explanations and not lose theoretical insight 
into the phenomena of interest. 
 Before I return to discussing ACToRs, let me illustrate the procedure outlined above 
with a concrete example taken from Ramsey’s book (this example will also prove useful 
further down the line in my argumentation against ACToRs). Among a number of cognitive-
scientific representational notions that Ramsey (2007) examines there is what he dubs the 
“receptor notion”. Ramsey thinks this is one of the most prevalent ways of conceptualizing 
representation in cognitive science (particularly in connectionist modelling and cognitive 
neuroscience). Receptors are supposed to represent in virtue of the fact that they reliably co-
vary with what is represented. For example, the role of representing a stimulus S is often 
ascribed to an individual neuron in the visual cortex of an animal on the basis that its activity 
reliably co-varies with presence of S in the animal’s visual field.  
 Do receptorsor, rather, our concept of representations as receptorsmeet the JDC? 
Ramsey’s discussion of this issue is quite complex and detailed, so for the sake of space, I 
will only present the gist of his analysis (for details, see Ramsey, 2007, pp. 118–150). The 
first thing to note is that the basic notion of representations as receptors is far too liberal. 
There are numerous reliable co-variances in the universe that, as it seems, do not represent 
anything or do not play any representational function. Thus, if we were to accept receptors as 
genuine representations, we would be faced with pan-representationalism, which would in 
effect trivialize representational explanations. One plausible way of avoiding this problem is 
to add a teleological element to the receptor notion. Following Dretske (1988), we might 
characterize receptors as structures that (1) reliably co-vary with some state of affairs and (2) 
are functional for some larger system or mechanism because of this co-variance. For example, 
a neuron in a visual cortex may not only co-vary with the presence of a stimulus, but also be 
functional (say, by producing appropriate behavior, like avoidance) for the organism precisely 
because it co-varies with it. However, even now the receptor notion is still too liberal, since 
we can point out counterexamples, that is, structures in the world that meet both those criteria 
but clearly do not function as representations. To take one of numerous counterexamples 
given by Ramsey, the firing pin’s function is to activate the discharge of the round by being 
reliably activated by pulling the trigger, but the firing pin obviously does not represent that 
the trigger was pulled.  
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 It seems, Ramsey observes, that there is a one last way to rehabilitate the receptor 
notion, namely by adding the concept of information to the picture. It might be said that a 
receptor is a representation when, in virtue of co-varying with a state of affairs, it encodes 
information about that state of affairs and is functional for a larger system because of the 
information it encodes. Ramsey goes to great lengths to neutralize this move as well. 
Roughly, he argues that in order to defend her case, the proponent of the receptor notion 
should be able to characterize the relationship between co-variance and information in such a 
way that it is possible to show that the latter, and not the former is what makes the receptor 
functional (otherwise we fall back on the firing pin counterexample). But Ramsey argues that 
this is only possible if we assume that the information is used by a full-blown (human-level) 
intentional agent who is able to understand the entailment relation holding between the 
receptor and the (represented) state of affairs. However, if this is so, then we cannot make use 
of the receptor notion to understand representations in the sense that is of interest to cognitive 
scientiststhat is, mental representations which are supposed to be located inside cognitive 
systems and used inside themsince we cannot (under the threat of homuncular fallacy or 
vicious regress) postulate agents with human-like interpretative abilities populating the 
insides of organisms. 
 The upshot of Ramsey’s discussion of the receptor notion is this. Purported receptor 
representations are not in fact in the business of representing anything. The way they function 
is more similar to the way gear-wheels function than to the way the things that we pre-
theoretically recognize as representationslike maps, fuel gauges, or sentences of natural 
languagefunction. For example, there is no sense in which receptors stand in for anything. 
No doubt receptors causally mediate between states of affairs, but causal mediation is 
obviously not sufficient for representation. Thus, according to Ramsey, the receptor notion 
does not meet the JDC. 
  
4. Do ACToRs meet the JDC? 
 
4.1. ACToRs and the JDC 
 
 Notice the affinity between Ramsey’s project in Representation Reconsidered and the 
aim of proponents of ACToRs. Both projects explicitly concentrate on the functional role that 
representations (purportedly) play within a cognitive system. In other words, when developing 
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their theories, proponents of ACToRs are asking precisely the type of question we should be 
asking, according to Ramsey, if we want an explanatorily valuable notion of representation, 
namely: What is it that representations do something for their users? Because they explicitly 
characterize representations in functional terms, it seems that ACToRs can be quite 
straightforwardly confronted with the JDC. All we need ask is whether internal structures that 
meet the “action-centric” functional criteria for being a representation in fact serve roles that 
are recognizably and in some illuminating or nontrivial way representational.  
 While I think that they are a step in a right direction when it comes to providing us 
with an explanatorily valuable notion of representation, as they stand, ACToRs fall quite short 
of meeting the JDC. In subsections 4.2 and 4.3, I will show why I think this is the case by 
discussing the shortcomings of, respectively, Bickhard’s interactivism and A&R’s action-
guidance theory. In subsection 4.4, I will consider a possible answer to my worries and show 
why this answer is unsatisfying. 
 
4.2. Bickhard’s interactivist theory: a counterargument and a counterexample 
 
 Let me start with Bickhard’s interactive theory. I think there are two arguments for the 
claim that the notion of representation embedded in this theory does not meet the JDC. One of 
these is purely conceptual, while the other is based on an counterexample drawn from actual 
empirical work done in cognitive science. 
 The first argument rests on the observation that there is no non-question-begging way 
of showing how exactly the function played in a cognitive system by indications of interactive 
potentialities can be qualified as representational. According to interactivism, those 
indications are internal structures or processes that (1) are activated or arise before the 
organism engages in particular action (say, predator avoidance); (2) can, and sometimes will, 
lead to the organism actually performing this action; (3) have semantic or representational 
contents that are determined by the conditions of success (dynamic presuppositions) of the 
action to which they can lead. Note that according to the theory, the representational status of 
indications of interactive potentialities is fully constituted by the role they play with respect to 
guiding or preselecting action. In other words, indications have property (3) in virtue of 
having properties (1) and (2). We may say, then, that the whole of Bickhard’s project is to 
explain representational normativity with the normativity of action. However, we need to 
keep separate two alternative ways in which this could be done. According to one possible 
strategy, we might say that the normativity of action is somehow explanatorily and/or 
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metaphysically relevant to the normativity of representation. This way of framing the issue 
invites a theory according to which something is a representation in virtue of being 
appropriately related to possible actions. But this does not mean that the appropriate 
connection to a possible action is, by itself, (necessary and) sufficient to make something a 
representation. My intention is not to argue against this idea. In fact, I take it to be on the right 
track (see section 5).  
 According to the second possible strategy of explaining representational normativity in 
terms of the normativity of actionwe may call it the “reductive” strategythe former is, as 
the saying goes, “nothing over and above” the latter. From this perspective, an action having 
conditions of success is the same as a representation (indication of interactive possibility) 
having content. However, this way we do not account for the nature of representations, but 
rather render representations explanatorily useless. Everything said using representational talk 
could be more economically said by reference to actual or possible (inter)actions and their 
conditions of success. There is no rationale for introducing representations into the picture. 
The simple fact that some internal activity could eventually cause an action whose success 
depends on environmental conditions gives, by itself, no leverage to the idea that this activity 
represents those conditions. Now, I think that by simply identifying dynamic presuppositions 
with (implicit) contents, Bickhard is committed to this second, reductive strategy. Given that 
this strategy is unsuccessful, I see no reason for claiming that interactivism gives us an 
explanatorily valuable notion of representation. 
 A proponent of the interactivist theory of representation might reply to this by pointing 
to the fact that interactive representations are not explicit, but rather represent their contents 
only implicitly. By giving this sort of response, the proponent of interactivism seems to 
embrace what Ramsey calls a “tacit” notion of representation (see Ramsey, 2007, pp. 151–
187). Supposed tacit representations are not encoded in some specific neural or computational 
structures, but are rather non-locally “embodied” in the internal functional architecture of a 
cognitive system as a whole (e.g. in the pattern of connection weights between the nodes of a 
neural network). Although it is not possible to delve into this topic right now, it needs to be 
stressed that it is highly debatable whether the notion of tacit or implicit representation meets 
the JDC. In fact, Ramsey (2007) presents a strong case for claiming that there is no way in 
which tacit or implicit “representations” are in fact in the business of representing anything. 
He argues that attributing tacit representations to a given systems boils down to saying that 
the system as a whole has some dispositional profile (e.g. it reacts differently to different 
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categories of objects). But this does not entail that there is anything even remotely 
functionally resembling a representation inside the system. 
 Now, I do not want to simply preclude the possibility that there are such things as tacit 
or implicit representations. However, I think that even if someone categorizes something as an 
implicit representation, she needs to provide a good rationale for using representational talk at 
all. Does Bickhard’s theory give us such a rationale? If so, what might it be? I think that the 
interactivist answer to these questions would probably run as follows. Each indicated action 
has some dynamic presuppositions, i.e. conditions of success. Those dynamic presuppositions 
are, according to Bickhard’s theory, what determines the representational content. However, 
there is nothing in the system that would explicitly represent this content. So the 
environmental conditions that constitute the dynamic presuppositions of indications of 
interactive potentialities must be represented only implicitly. Notice, however, that this sort of 
answer manifestly begs the question. It simply gives us no good reason to postulate 
representations in the first place. It merely presupposes representations. Indications of 
interactive potentialities enable the organism to perform actions that have conditions of 
success. This is the only way in which those indications are related to external conditions. 
Saying that they also represent contents, even implicitly, simply adds nothing genuinely new 
or explanatorily valuable to the picture. Thus, again, there is no theoretical or explanatory 
benefit in postulating representations here. 
 Let me now turn to the second, more empirically-oriented argument against 
interactivism. The point is simple: there exist clearly non-representational explanations in 
cognitive science that nonetheless do meet the criteria for being representational put forward 
by interactivism. Explanations of this kind constitute counterexamples for interactivism and 
show that the notion of representation embedded in Bikchard’s theory is too liberal to meet 
the JDC.  
 To see this, consider a famous work by Randall Beer (2003) that is often cited as a 
model example of anti-representationalism in cognitive science. In this study, Beer describes 
a virtual organisma result of many generations of virtual natural selectioninhabiting a 
two-dimensional virtual environment. The agent’s movements are controlled by a three-layer 
neural network attached to a virtual eye. The organism is able to perform horizontal 
movements in order to engage in one of two possible actions: catching or avoidance. Its whole 
virtual “life” consists of facing the challenge of avoiding diamond-shaped objects and 
catching circles, with both kinds of objects falling on it from above. Importantly, the agent 
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stumbles upon not only diamonds and circles, but also hybrids of these two shapes whose 
categorical membership is more vague. 
 In his article, Beer (2003) has shown that although the agent exhibits behavior that 
should earn it the status of a minimally cognitive system (it had an ability for active 
categorical perception of objects falling on it), the network that controls its movement does 
not make use of any internal structures that would deserve the label “representations”. Beer’s 
reasoning for this latter claim is familiar: his dynamic-systems-based analysis of the 
mechanism controlling the agent’s actions showed that there is nothing inside this mechanism 
that could be nontrivially described as performing a representational function, thus rendering 
representations explanatorily useless in this case. The virtual agent does not make use of any 
kind of model of its environment. It does not make use of any kind of diamond- or circle-
detectors either, as there are no internal states that would systematically and exclusively co-
vary with either of those shapes. Although the system’s behavior as a whole could be usefully 
described using intentional-sounding categorieslike “deciding” or “intending” to avoid 
objectsthere are no internal, causally relevant structures governing its actions that 
correspond to those categories. All in all, to put it in Ramsey’s terms, Beer’s virtual agent is a 
non-representational system because there is nothing inside it that would meet the JDC (i.e. 
play a truly representational function). 
 Notice, however, that despite being a non-representational system, Beer’s agent 
nonetheless seems to meet interactivism’s criteria for being representational. First, it has the 
ability to select one of two possible actions, each of which has some conditions of success 
(dynamical presuppositions) and which could potentially fail, as e.g. when the system 
“decides” to catch a diamond. Second, the agent is controlled by a neural network that makes 
use of internal states and processes that meet the criteria for indicating interactive 
potentialities. Whenever the organism scans its environment, there are ongoing patterns of 
activity in the middle layer of virtual neurons (those that send motor commands to the third, 
motor layer) that could and sometimes eventually would cause the agent to perform one of the 
actions available to it. The patterns leading to each action seem to “compete” with each other 
for control (as Beer [2003, p. 221] puts it, his results “[...] suggest that the ‘decision’ [about 
how to act] is repeatedly made and unmade as the agent and the object interact” until the 
organism eventually “commits” and actually performs one of the actions. It seems, then, that 
interactivism would have us think that in this case there are patterns of internal activity that 
(1) precede action and (2) could potentially lead to the agent performing a particular action; 
thus we should say that these patterns indicate interactive potentialities that therefore (3) 
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represent the action’s conditions of success. It follows that Beer’s virtual agent is a non-
representational system that is categorized as representational by Bickhard’s theory. This 
shows that the notion of representation present in interactivism is too liberal: it lets too many 
things count as representations. Of course, someone might claim that interactivism shows that 
our evaluation of the example should be reconsidered and that we are dealing with a 
representation-using system after all. But this move does not seem warranted. It would require 
stretching the notion of representation beyond the point of usefulness. As Beer (2003, p. 239) 
himself puts it, if the mechanisms of the sort he describes “look nothing like representations, 
and they act nothing like re-presentations, then they are not representations, and continuing to 
call them representations is just going to confuse everyone”. 
 
4.3. Anderson and Rosenberg’s action guidance theory and the frog’s fly detection 
mechanism 
 
 Let me now turn to A&R’s action guidance theory. I think this theory is also open to 
counterexamples. However, this time instead of looking for a counterexample in cognitive 
science, I would like to critically re-examine the case that A&R themselves present as an 
illustration of their theory, namely the famous fly-catching mechanism in frogs (Anderson & 
Rosenberg, 2008; see also Lettvin et al. 1959). Whenever a fly or a fly-like moving object is 
placed within a frog’s field of vision, retinal ganglion cells are activated, which in turn 
activate neurons in the frog’s optic tectum. Neurons in the optic tectum are connected with 
neural structures that control the frog’s behavior. The mechanism is set up such that it causes 
the frog to orient its head in the fly’s (or fly-like object’s) direction and snap its tongue to 
catch it. According to A&R (2008), this is a simple representational mechanism. What 
justifies interpreting it in representational terms is that the activity in the optic tectum is 
functionally involved in guiding the frog’s actions in a way that meets A&R’s functional 
criteria of being a representation. 
 Why do I think that the frog example can in fact be used to show that action guidance 
theory does not meet the JDC? Basically, the idea is that by treating the fly-detection 
mechanism as representational, A&R’s theory is faced with the same problems that bug the 
receptor notion of representation discussed in section 3. The fly-detection mechanism 
employs an internal structure that is reliably activated by the presence of flies (or fly-like 
objects) and whose function it is to initiate actions with respect to that which activated it. In 
other words, it acts a sort of action-guiding receptor (see Ramsey 2007). It turns out then that 
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receptorsor, rather, those receptors that are involved in controlling the actions of cognitive 
agentsconstitute at least a subset of structures that meet the functional criteria of being a 
representation put forward by A&R in their action guidance theory. However, for reasons I 
have presented in section 3, it seems that receptors do not play a representational function in 
cognitive systems. We may simply conceptualize them as internal causal mediators without 
losing any explanatory power or insight into the workings of a given system. The same 
applies to frog’s fly-detection mechanism. But this means that the neurons in frog’s optic 
tectum are an example of a nonrepresentational structures that nonetheless meet A&R’s 
criteria. If so, then it follows that action guidance theory would have us treat as 
representations structures that do not really perform a function of representing anything. 
Action guidance theory is too liberal; the way it construes representations falls short of 
meeting the JDC3. 
 When presenting their theory, A&R (2008) seem to anticipate this sort of criticism and 
attempt to answer it preemptively. They claim that we do have a reason to think that fly-
detection in frogs in achieved by employing representations, and not simply by employing a 
multi-step causal chain. To show this, they contrast (what they take to be) representation-
guided actions of frogs with a nonrepresentational, purely casual action guidance in the case 
of slime-mold’s phototaxis. In short, they claim that what distinguishes the former from the 
latter is that in the frog’s case there is a potential decoupling of stimulus and response.4 There 
                                                             
3 Interestingly, the fly example is occasionaly also used by Bickhard and his co-workers to illustrate the 
interactivist approach to representation (see e.g. Bickhard & Campbell, 1996, Bickhard & Terveen, 1995). On 
this construal, because the activation of neurons in the optic tectum enables the frog to perform tongue flicking 
action (i.e. it increases the probability that the frog will in fact perform this action), this activity indicates a 
certain interactive potentiality, and thus constitutes a representation. However, conceptualizing this example in 
interactivist terms does not neutralize Ramsey’s critique any better than conceptualizing it using action guidance 
theory. For example, the fly catching mechanism remains a non-representational causal mediation mechanism 
even if we accept that, as the proponents of interactivism point out, the neural activity in the frog’s optic tectum 
causes tongue-flicking action only ceteris paribus (for example, only if the frog is not at the same time exposed 
to a shadow of a predatory bird; see Bickhard & Campbell, 1996). I have decided to discuss the fly catching 
specifically in context of A&R’s theory because of how these authors develop this example by introducing the 
notion of potential decoupling (see main text for details).  
4 In fact, there is one more difference between these two cases that A&R mention: whereas in the slime mold 
case the environment directly controls behavior, in the frog’s case the stimulus first registers inside the brain, 
and then action is controlled by this internal registration (rather than directly by the stimulus). One of the 
reviewers of this article pointed out that it might be argued that, by assuming that registration is involved, A&R  
are not in fact advocating a purely action-centric theory, but rather advocate a two-factor theory of sorts. After 
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are two stages of processing at which this decupling can occur. First, internal 
registrationdefined as “a distinct and characteristic inner state, typically formed in response 
to a certain kind of bodily (sensory) change, and taken up into a behavioral control system” 
(Anderson & Rosenberg, 2008, p. 62, n. 8)can be decoupled from external stimuli. For 
example, in the frog’s case, neurons in the optic tectum can register a whole lot of 
stimulilike bits of paper or dots on screenother than just flies. Because these stimuli may 
have nothing in common physically, we cannot, according to A&R, explain the frog’s 
behavior simply by reference to the causal features of the stimuli. Second, there can be a 
decoupling between the registration and the behavioral reaction it causes. For example, if we 
unilaterally remove the frog’s optic tectum, eventually its optic tract will innervate the intact 
part of the optic tectum. As a result, the pattern of the frog’s reactions to stimuli will be 
inverted and the frog will snap its tongue at the spot where the mirror image of a fly would be. 
 I do not think that potential decoupling is enough to delineate representational from 
nonrepresentational action-guiding mechanisms. First, the existence of decoupling between 
stimulus and registration by no means entails that we need semantic notions to explain a 
system’s reactivity to stimuli. For example, although there is a range of objects that can 
potentially be registered by a frog’s optic tectum, there is no reason not to think that these 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
all, by employing the frog example, they point not only to how the (postulated) representations in the optic 
tectum guide action, but also to the fact they systematically co-vary with the presence of flies, which may be 
considered as establishing some kind of correspondence between the representational vehicle and what it 
represents. Three things need to be said in this context. First, despite the fact that this particular example includes 
co-variation between the representation and the represented object as part of the story, calling A&R’s theory 
“two-factor” would be unwarranted. These authors do not claim that any sort of correspondence is in any way 
necessary to establish a representation. On their view, what is constitutive of representation is solely how the 
vehicle guides action with respect to what is represented. Nonetheless, this does not preclude the vehicle 
(sometimes) being in addition causally or co-variationally related to what is represented. So detectors still fall 
within the category of representations according to A&R. Thus, showing that these structures are in fact not 
representational still constitutes a countexample to A&R’s theory. I have decided to discuss the frog example 
simply because A&R themselves employ it to illustrate their version of an ACToR. Second, I think the criticism 
presented here remains perfectly conclusive even when we stick to A&R’s theory and completely ignore the fact 
that the neurons in frog’s optic tectum co-vary with the presence of flies. If anything, ignoring this fact would 
make the case for frogs using representations to detect flies even weaker. Third, as I see it, adding registration to 
the story makes a difference in quantity, not quality, and it boils down to the fact that the causal chain leading 
from the environment to behavior is longer in the frog’s case than in the case of, say, the slime mold. This is not 
enough to render the frog’s fly-detection mechanism representational (see a related discussion in Ramsey, 2007, 
pp. 189–203). 
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objects do share some causal, or causally relevant, properties; namely, properties like being 
(appropriately) small, being dark, or exhibiting a certain movement patterns. All objects that 
activate a frog’s snapping behavior have these properties in common and activate it in virtue 
of having these properties.  
 Second, the decoupling of registration and response can be easily understood as an 
abnormal reversal or reshuffling of a biological causal chain. By removing part of a frog’s 
causal optic tectum, an optic tract connects with the part of the optic tectum with which it 
would not be connected normally. Part A of a causal chain, which would normally produce 
effect B, now produces effect C.  The same sort of reversal of a causal chain can be rather 
trivially achieved in non-biological artifacts like light switches or taps, but nobody would 
suspect these artifacts of being representational because of this.  
 Third, even if both types of decoupling co-occur in a given mechanism, this still gives 
no leverage to a representational, as opposed to purely causal, explanation of this mechanism. 
Take the frog example again. The mechanism that subserves the frog’s snapping behavior can 
be quite easily explained purely associatively, as a sort of reflex. In the frog’s natural 
environment, the appearance of food is systematically correlated with the appearance of 
stimulus that has a certain color, size and exhibits certain movement pattern. The frog has a 
reflex mechanism that causes it to automatically snap its tongue in the direction of the 
stimulus. This reflex can be activated by objects other than food, as long as they have the 
appropriate features. Whenever this happens, the frog’s action is unsuccessful because it fails 
to provide the frog with food. Furthermore, if we damage this mechanism in a certain way, it 
can partially regenerate, but (because of such and such causal or physiological factors) the 
resulting pattern of behavioral reactions to stimuli may become reversed in interesting ways. I 
think that this sort of explanation tells usthough admittedly in a very general wayall we 
need to know in order to gain a basic understanding of a frog’s snapping behavior. Note that it 
does not invoke representations or semantic properties. Instead, it exclusively refers to a 
reflex-based causal chain and a purely practical (nonrepresentational) connection between the 
frog’s actions and environmental conditions.     
 Before I move on, let me be clear about exactly what I am arguing for. I do not doubt 
that potential decoupling distinguishes some action-guiding internal structures from others. 
Furthermore, I do not want to put into question the idea that this distinction can be 
theoretically or explanatorily interesting and useful. As A&R (2008) show, a control 
mechanism that is potentially decoupled can be more flexible than one that is not, and 
therefore the former can have some adaptive advantages over the latter. Nonetheless, I think it 
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is far from clear how potential decoupling could distinguish representational from 
nonrepresentational action-guiding structures. In fact, I think that the frog example shows 
that these two distinctions (potentially-decoupled/not-potentially-decoupled vs. 
representational/nonrepresentational) are orthogonal. 
 
4.4. Error detection to the rescue? 
 
 I now want to investigate one potential line of defense that a proponent of action-
centric approach might use against my argumentation. According to this defensive strategy, 
the whole discussion of this section is inconclusive because I have failed to take into account 
one crucially important element of ACToRs. As mentioned in subsections 2.2 and 2.3, 
Bickhard and A&R claim that the strength of their respective theories partially lies in the fact 
that they can account for the ability to detect representational error. According to ACToRs, 
representational error is recognized or detected on the basis of failure of action. Now, one 
might propose that this ability to explain error detection not only gives ACToRs an advantage 
over correspondence-centric theories of representation, it also enables them to meet the JDC. 
According to this line of reasoning, what gives some internal state or structure a 
representational status in not only the fact that it is appropriately involved in guiding or pre-
selecting actions, but also the fact that when it fails in performing its action-related function, 
it fails in a way that is detectable for a cognitive system. To understand how something comes 
to play the role of representation, one needs to take into account those two facts. To say this in 
a different way, what is constitutive of something being a representation is both that it plays a 
role in guiding action and that, in virtue of being so tied to action, it makes representational 
error-detection possible. 
 I do not think that this argument is successful. To say that action failure indicates 
inaccurate or false representation, one needs to assume that the action in question was guided 
by a representation in the first place. One cannot treat action failure as way of telling that a 
representation is inaccurate unless one has some independent way of establishing that the 
action in question was guided by a representation. More broadly, it seems wrong to treat the 
possibility of detecting a representational error as co-constitutive of having the status of 
representation, because qualifying some process as “representational error detection” requires 
presupposing some understanding of representation whose being-in-error might be detected. 
As long as a given action is not guided by representations in the first place, it is unjustified to 
say that a representational error has been detected in this situation. At most, what has been 
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detected is a purely practical error, and not a practical error that resulted from inaccurate 
representation, thus indicating the inaccuracy of a representation. 
 There is one last point to be made before we move on. One reviewer of this paper 
suggested that there is a way in which we may treat the ability for error detection as 
conferring a representational status on a cognitive structure. According to this suggestion, the 
ability to detect error is representational as long as the error detection does not modify action 
on-line, that is, as long as the action in question is not modified immediately. As I understand 
this idea, error detection should be considered representational if it is used to control action 
off-line; for example, if it is used to modify future as opposed to current actions.  
 I remain unconvinced. Consider two imaginary, simple artificial systems: robot A and 
robot B. In both cases, their movements are controlled by an artificial neural network that 
does not make use of representations in any recognizable or explanatorily valuable way, in the 
vein of Beer’s aforementioned artificial agent. Now, imagine we alter both A and B by giving 
them the ability to receive feedback signals from the environment, which in turn enables them 
to detect when their respective actions are failing. There is one difference, though. In the case 
of robot A, the feedback signal is used to modify actions as they unfold on-line. In the case of 
robot B, the feedback signal is not used to modify on-line action. Rather, B uses the signal to 
change the connection weights in the network that controls its movement in way that will 
modify the way it acts in the future; in other words, it uses error detection off-line, to prepare 
future, as opposed to current, actions. If we follow the suggestion discussed here, somehow 
the fact that the actions being modified are “postponed” in time should make B a 
representational system, as opposed to a non-representational system such as A. But it seems 
to me that the way robot B works is not sufficiently different from the way A works to make 
B representational; after all, the actions of both robots were not controlled by representations 
in the first place. I do not see how the difference in the length of the temporal interval that 
separates error detection from action modification could turn a non-representational system 
into a representational system. 
 
5. Overcoming the limitations of ACToRs. An outline of a two-factor theory of 
representation 
 
 Although the discussion so far has been critical of ACToRs, my aim is not to discard 
the action-centric approach altogether. I think ACToRs are on a right track. Rather, what I 
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intend to argue for is that playing a role in guiding or preselecting actions is not sufficient to 
make something a representation.5 I think that ACToRs give us a good idea of what it is that 
representations do, but they leave unanswered the question of how representations (as 
opposed to non-representations) work. Another way to put it is that action guidance is a good 
candidate for a genus of an explanatorily valuable concept of representation. What is missing 
from this picture is a good ideaor any ideaabout the nature of differentia specifica that 
distinguishes representational action guidance from the kind of action guidance that is 
achieved without employing representations. 
 Let me illustrate this point with an example. Imagine that three people face the 
challenge of navigating their way from point A to point B in a city they do not know. Suppose 
that each person succeeds at navigating the route, but each one does it using a different 
strategy. Person 1 is led through the streets of the city by a local who already knows the way. 
Person 2 is given instructions to follow a trail composed of little red balls that, as it happens, 
are arranged in such a way so as to lead from A to B (thus, person 2 navigates the city by 
being directly coupled with what we might call, following Rick Grush, a “presentation”, see 
Grush, 1997). Person 3 succeeds because she is given a map of the city on which both points 
A (her original location) and B are marked. 
 In each of those cases there is somethinganother person, a ball trail, a mapthat can 
be attributed the role of “action-guider”. But only in the case of person 3 can we justifiedly 
say that her action is guided by a representation (or at the very least directly so guided, given 
that it might be the case that person 1 is guided by a local who in turn is guided by an internal 
mental representation of the city). If we want a theory of representation, the crucial thing to 
ask is this: What distinguishes the navigational strategy employed by person 3 from the 
strategies employed by the two other people?  
                                                             
5 It needs to be noted that in an article clarifying and defending the action guidance theory, Anderson and 
Anthony Chemero (2009) seem to be aware that treating action guidance as a sufficient condition for the 
functional role of a representation is wrong: “[…] although the guidance theory says that representations are 
such in virtue of their role in guiding action (all representations are action-guiders), it does not claim that 
everything that guides action is therefore a representation” (p. 308). However, this sort of concession raises some 
problems for the action guidance theory. First, it seems to suggest that the theory is only committed to what I 
have called in section 2 a weak interpretation of action-centrism. But this would be disappointing, since not 
many people would argue against the weak version of ACToRs, which simply says that representations are for 
action guidance. Second, this concessive move naturally raises a further question: If action guidance is by itself 
insufficient for making something a representation, what other conditions need to be met? This is the exact 
question I am attempting to answer in the present section. 
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 I propose that the difference-making factor here is the fact that in order to succeed, 
person 3 exploits what we might generally call a “correspondence” between the map and the 
terrain. More precisely, what I think makes the case of person 3 a case of representation-use is 
the fact that (1) this person (a representation user) uses a map (a representational vehicle) to 
guide her action with respect to the terrain (what is represented), and (2) she does it by 
employing a strategy whose navigational (action-guiding) success is non-accidentally 
dependent on whether a certain type of relation holdsor holds to a sufficient 
degreebetween the map (representational vehicle) and terrain (what is represented). But 
what sort of relation are we talking about? Without delving into detail, it may be characterized 
as a homomorphism or some kind of structural similarity between how constituents of the 
map are spatially-relationally organized and how the constituents of the terrain are spatially-
relationally organized (see Bartels, 2006; Cummins, 1989; O’Brien & Opie, 2004; Swoyer, 
1991).6 Importantly, however, it needs to be stressed that the existence of this similarity is by 
no means sufficient for making the map a representation. Rather, what constitutes its 
representational status is both its action-guiding function and the way performing this 
function is dependent on the relevant relation holding between the map and the represented 
terrain.7  
 What do I mean exactly by action guidance being “dependent” on the relation between 
the representational vehicle and what is represented? I mean that the relation between the 
                                                             
6 To be fair, it needs to be said that A&R at least (2008) do not deny that representational action guidance can 
sometimes be achieved by exploiting structural similarities, or isomorphisms, to be more precise. However, at 
the same time they do not argue that it is co-constitutive of representations that they guide actions by exploiting 
isomorphisms. Rather, for A&R, this is just one empirically plausible way in which representations might work 
or become established. This sort of claim is obviously much weaker than the two-factor theory I am arguing for 
here, where being a representation is co-constituted by the role played in action guidance by the relation between 
the representational vehicle and what is represented. On my view, if something is not based on exploiting such a 
relation, it becomes deeply problematic how it gets to play a representational role at all. 
7 It needs to be said that the choice of structural similarity as the relation that establishes the correspondence is 
theoretically important. As the frog example discussed in previous section shows, if we instead chose a simple 
co-variation or causality as the relation that holds between the vehicle and what is represented, the two-factor 
theory would not meet the JDC. In other words, not all correspondence-grounding relations are created equal and 
not all of them can serve as a basis for a workable two-factor theory of representation (see also Ramsey, 2007; 
von Eckhardt, 1993). By choosing structural similarity as the relation that establishes the correspondence, I treat 
internal representations that feature in cognitive-scientific explanations as a species of simulation-, structural- or 
S-representations (see Bartels, 2006; Cummins, 1989; O’Brien & Opie, 2004; Ramsey, 2007). 
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representation and what it represents is causally and thus explanatorily relevant for whether 
the representation succeeds in providing action guidance. I understand “causal relevance” 
along James Woodward’s (2003) interventionist lines here, basically meaning to say that by 
intervening in whether the appropriate relation holdsor by intervening in the degree to 
which it holdswe could manipulate the representation user’s practical or navigational 
success. This way, we can explain the representation-user’s practical success by pointing to 
facts regarding whether the appropriate relation holdsor to what degree it holdsbetween 
the representational vehicle and what is represented. Take the map example again. A map is a 
useful action-guider only if its structure matches or resemblesor to the degree it matches or 
resemblesthe structure of that which it represents (even when it is a highly idealized and 
simplified map, like the map of the London Underground). The existence (or the degree) of 
this resemblance is casually relevant to whether the map successfully guides action. 
 To sum up the discussion so far, the lesson is that representations are things that 
succeed in playing their action-guiding function by exploiting a certain relation between the 
representation itself (the vehicle) and what it represents. By no means do I think that this says 
anything revolutionary or new about the nature of representations. However, it seems to me 
that it nonetheless shows how both purely correspondence-centric (or input-centric) and 
purely action-centric (or output-centric) accounts of representation miss their target. By 
defending the former type of theory, we try to reduce representation to the relation between 
the representational vehicle and what it represents. By defending the latter type of theory, we 
try to reduce representation to the relationship between the representational vehicle and the 
representation user. But neither of those two ways of construing representations works. 
Problems with correspondence-centrism have already been discussed in detail in the literature 
(see e.g. Bickhard, 1993; Bickhard & Terveen, 1995; Miłkowski, 2013). What I have been 
trying to show here is that action-centrism does not succeed either, since by focusing so much 
on action, it fails to give us an idea about what distinguishes representational action-guidance 
from nonrepresentational action-guidance. However, I also think that both views describe part 
of the truth. I propose that to account for the nature of representations, we need a two-factor 
theory that skilfully combines both perspectives by treating representations as action-guiding 
structures that work by exploiting a relation between a representational vehicle and what is 
represented (for a somewhat similar proposal put forward in the context of teleosemantics, see 
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Shea, 2007, 2013).8 I suggest that only then can we form a notion of representation that does 
meet the JDC and thus can explain cognitive phenomena in a genuinely and nontrivially 
representational way.  
 Note also that this two-factor theory can meet Bickhard’s demand that a successful 
theory of representation needs to account for the representation user being able to detect a 
representational error. I think that the proponents of ACToRs are right in saying that in order 
to account for representational error detection, we need to closely tie representations to 
actions, so that a representation’s being in error can be detected indirectly, by detecting the 
failure of an action that was guided by this representation. Although this idea is basically 
correct, by itself it is not enough, as I have shown above, to distinguish between detecting a 
representational error from detecting a purely practical error. To account for an ability to 
detect genuinely representational error, we need to show how the action in questionthat is, 
an action failure upon which this detection is basedhas been guided by representation in the 
first place. And a two-factor account tells us how we can do this: a given action was 
                                                             
8 Importantly, the two-factor theory as I understand it here should be distinguished from a two-factor theory of 
mental content defended by philosophers like Ned Block (1986) and Hartry Field (1997). This latter theory stems 
from an attempt to combine two separate theories of content: the causal or covariance theory (which states that 
mental representation’s content is determined by covariance or a causal relation between the representation and 
what it represents) and functional or conceptual role semantics (which states that representation’s content is 
determined by the functional roles it plays with regards to perceptual input, other representational states, and 
action output). According to the theory advocated by Block and Field, intentional content is determined both by 
world-head causal or covariational relations and the functional roles played by representations in a cognitive 
system. There are at least three major differences between this sort of two-factor theory and the proposal I 
advocate in the present article. First, they differ with respect to the problem they attempt to solve. The two-factor 
theory I defend here is a theory of what it means for something to function as a representation in a cognitive 
system and thus explain cognitive phenomena as a representation. The two-factor theory that Block and Field opt 
for is a theory of mental content, that is, of how what the representation is about is determined. Second, although 
both theories are similar in that they understand one “factor” as a head-world relation, and the other as a 
functional property of the representational vehicle, they nonetheless differ in how they specifically construe 
those factors. When it comes to head-world factor, while Block and Field’s theory refers to causation or 
covariance, the theory on offer here refers to structural similarity. When it comes to the functional factor, while 
Block and Field’s theory refers to overall functional roles played by the representational vehicle, my two-factor 
theory refers solely to how the representational vehicle guides action. Third, contrary to the two-factor theory of 
mental content, the proposal on offer here is explicitly committed to the claim that both factors should be 
appropriately related to each other, that is, the representation’s success at guiding action should depend on 
whether head-world relationthe structural similarityholds (see main text for details). 
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representation-guided if it was guided by a structure (representational vehicle) whose success 
in providing action guidance non-accidentally depends on a relation between this structure 
itself and that with respect to which the action is guided (what is represented). Take the 
example I have given above. People 1, 2, and 3 can all potentially fail to get from point A to 
point B in an alien city. If they do not succeed, no doubt they can detect this fact. But in such 
a case, only person 3 has failed to achieve success after using a representation-based 
navigational strategy. Only in her case can the detection of a practical failure serve as a way 
of telling that a representation was in error. 
 One last, but crucially important thing that should be mentioned here is that maps or 
other representational devices that are cultural artifacts cannot, of course, be unqualifiedly 
treated as models for representations in a sense that could be explanatorily useful for cognitive 
science. Cognitive scientists need a notion of representation that does not require 
representations to be interpreted by cognitive agents with human-level cognitive capacities, 
according to culturally constructed and culturally transmitted rules of interpretation (O’Brien 
& Opie, 2004; Ramsey, 2007). Is such a notion even achievable? Answering this question in 
detail is way beyond the scope of this article, but I think that the short answer is yes. Take for 
example Rick Grush’s (1997, 2004) famous emulation theory of representation. What Grush 
essentially proposes is an explanation of motor control according to which, in order to control 
the body in a swift and effective manner, the motor system employs an internal model of the 
musculoskeletal system. In line with what Grush himself claims, I think emulation theory is a 
genuinely representational explanation that uses the notion of internal representations as 
mechanical or automated “models” or “maps”.  
 I propose that emulators owe their representational status to the fact that they meet the 
criteria put forward by a two-factor theory. For one thing, they meet the “action-centric” 
criterion, simply because they are in the business of guiding actions. As A&R put it, “[…] 
what, exactly, is it for R to be used as an emulator of E, that is, what ties it to E in particular? 
[…] Our account answers this crucial question by saying that R is used as an emulator of E, 
and is, therefore, a representation of E, just in case (as with all representations) R is used to 
guide the subject’s actions with respect to E […]” (2008, p. 58). This is right. But it is also 
incomplete, since it fails to take into account that a nonrepresentational structure could 
potentially guide actions with respect to E. What makes something an emulatorand thus a 
representationis how it works, namely in a model- or map-like manner. In other words, 
what is co-constitutive of an emulator as a form of representation is that it meets the 
“correspondence-centric” criterion as well. An emulator is successful in performing its 
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function only insofar as it generates adequate anticipations for the motor system; but it is 
anticipatory only insofar as the workings of an emulator “mimic” or resemble the workings of 
the body, or the body–world loop. For example, if we assume that emulators are 
“articulated”i.e. that they are composed of elements whose dynamics of interactions are 
meant to model the dynamics of interactions between parts of the musculoskeletal system (see 
Grush 2004)then they are successful in performing their action-guiding function to the 
extent to which the way the emulator works structurally or dynamically resembles the way the 
musculoskeletal system works. This dependence of the emulator’s action-guiding function on 
the similarity relation is important for understanding both how emulators work and what it is 
exactly that gives them their representational status. Last, note that according to Grush (1997, 
2004), the results of the emulation process are continuously compared against real-world 
sensory feedback. I propose that if the system detects a discrepancy between the two, this may 
count as genuine case in which the discrepancy between the world and its internal 
modelthat is, representational errorhas been detected (see also Miłkowski, 2013). 
 
6. Conclusion 
  
 I have tried to show that while not without merits, ACToRs fall short of providing us 
with an explanatorily valuable notion of representation. This is because representations, as 
they are understood in action-centric theories, do not meet William Ramsey’s job description 
challenge. To show this, I pointed to cognitive structures that fulfil the ACToR’s functional 
criteria for counting as a representation, but which (1) quite manifestly do not play a 
representational function within a cognitive system, and thus (2) do not, and cannot explain 
phenomena qua representations. I have also put forward a diagnosis of where the problem 
with ACToRs lies exactly. According to this diagnosis, by putting so much emphasis on the 
role that representations play in controlling actions, proponents of ACToRs have lost sight of 
what is equally important for making representations what they are, namely the fact that using 
representations consists in exploiting a relation that holds between the representational vehicle 
and what is represented. Last, I have proposed a recipe for this theoretical situation by 
outlining a two-factor theory which marries the idea that representations are for guiding action 
with the idea that representational function depends on the existence of a correspondence 
(structural similarity) between representational vehicle with what is represented. Without 
doubt, what I have shown is just a sketch and there are a lot of questions that this two-factor 
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theory still faces. For now however, suffice it to conclude that if I am right, then 
representations need two legs to stand on in order to play their explanatory role qua 
representations in cognitive science. 
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